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Abstract
The present study examined the role of prime strength on the lateralized affective priming effect.
Participants were presented unilateral primes (i.e., either to the left or right visual field) and then made
evaluative decisions on centrally presented targets. Across both experiments, the affective congruity
effect occurred for high, but not low, arousing primes. In Experiment 1, when stimuli were primes or
targets but not both, the affective priming effect occurred in the right visual field (left hemisphere) for
high arousing primes. However in Experiment 2, when stimuli were presented as both primes and
targets receiving repeated parafoveal and foveal exposure of primes, the affective priming effect
occurred in the left visual field (right hemisphere) for high arousing primes. The present experiments
support the right hemisphere hypothesis of superior affective and arousal processing, but only when
stimuli receive adequate foveal exposure of prime stimuli. Thus, the present results emphasize task
structure (i.e., mode of repeated exposure) in producing lateralized affective priming.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The scientific literature demonstrating that the cerebral hemispheres process affective
information asymmetrically is vast (e.g., see Borod, Zgaljardic, Taberta, & Koff, 2001; Davidson, 1992,
1998; Demaree, Everhart, Youngstrom, & Harrison, 2005; Heller, 1993; Heller, Nitschke, & Miller,
1998; Tucker & Frederick, 1989). For instance, the left and right frontal regions of the brain differ in
electrophysiological responses depending on motivational direction (e.g., approach vs. withdrawal;
Harmon-Jones, 2003) as well as positive and negative valence (e.g., Davidson & Fox, 1982; Graham &
Cabeza, 2001). Also, a wealth of studies found that damage to the right hemisphere significantly impairs
affective perception (Borod, Bloom, Brickman, Nakhutina, & Curko, 2002). Thus, the hemispheres
appear to contribute uniquely to affective perception aiding in important determinations such as whether
a stimulus is hostile or hospitable.
While there are a variety of theoretical positions on affective processing and hemispheric
asymmetry, systematic reviews most strongly favor the idea that affective information is preferentially
processed in the right-hemisphere (Borod et al., 2002; Borod, Zgaljardic, Taberta, & Koff, 2001). The
right-hemisphere hypothesis (see Demaree, et al., 2005 for review) maintains that the posterior portion
of the right-hemisphere processes affective information regardless of the valence and modulates arousal
(see Heller, 1993). Heller’s (1993) arousal and hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis is supported in
studies ranging from autonomic measures (Meadows & Kaplan, 1994; Zoccolotti, Scabini, & Violani,
1982) to self-reported assessments linked to the right-hemisphere (Heller, Nitschke, & Lindsay, 1997h).
The aim of the present study was to explore the right-hemisphere hypothesis in the affective priming
paradigm.
Inspired by methods and theory of cognitive psychology (see Neely, 1991), the affective priming
paradigm1 has boomed in the social psychological literature in recent decades (see De Houwer, TeigeMocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Fazio, 2001; Ferguson & Bargh, 2003; Klauer & Musch, 2003;
1

Wittenbrink, 2007 for reviews). In the affective priming paradigm, pairs of stimuli are quickly
presented sequentially. An affective priming effect occurs when the response latency to the second
stimulus (i.e., target) is quicker following a congruent valent stimulus (i.e., prime) than an incongruent
valent stimulus. For instance, the target word SAINT is responded to quicker if preceded by the prime
word CARNIVAL than FUNERAL. In addition to contributing to basic theory, the affective priming
paradigm has been used to examine racial prejudice (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), body
image evaluations (Watts, Cranney, & Gleitzman, 2008), and a number of clinical conditions
(Dannlowski et al., 2006; Kerns, 2005; Suslow, Arolt, & Junghanns, 1998). Twenty-five years of
research demonstrate that the affective priming effect is robust (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, &
Kardes, 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1994; Herring, Taylor, White, & Crites, 2011; Spruyt,
Hermans, De Houwer, Eelen, & Vandromme, 2007).
A limitation of prior conceptualizations is that researchers almost exclusively studied affective
priming with regard to how the hemispheres operate jointly. That is, in a typical affective priming
paradigm, both the prime and target are presented to the participant centrally (i.e., to the fovea) rather
than presenting these stimuli unilaterally in order to examine separate hemispheric contributions. By the
author’s count, only three recent studies by Calvo and his group (Calvo & Avero, 2008; Calvo &
Nummenmaa, 2007; Calvo, Nummenmaa, & Avero, 2010) examined hemispheric asymmetry of the
affective priming effect. Rather than presenting primes centrally like most affective priming paradigms,
Calvo and colleagues presented affective pictures as primes parafoveally (i.e., 2.5° from a central
fixation) and targets foveally. In this way, the researchers were able to determine whether the affective
priming effect was specific to primes presented in the left visual field (LVF; right hemisphere [RH]) or
the right visual field (RVF; left hemisphere [LH]). In line with the hypothesis that the right hemisphere
is specialized for affective processing (see Demaree, et al., 2005; Heller, 1993), Calvo and colleagues
found an affective priming effect in the LVF (RH) in seven of nine experiments2 (Calvo & Avero, 2008,
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experiments 2 & 3; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007, Experiments 1–4 & 6). That is, centrally presented
target responses were faster when a congruent prime was presented to the LVF (RH) compared to when
an incongruent prime was presented to the LVF (RH); the affective priming effect was not observed in
the RVF (LH) for the majority of Calvo and colleagues’ experiments (but see Chapter 4 below). This
lateralized affective priming effect was, however, contingent on two types of exposure techniques.
The first exposure technique important for obtaining a lateralized affective priming effect was
repeated exposure. Calvo and colleagues repeatedly exposed participants to the experimental stimuli
across a number of experimental blocks. The lateralized affective priming effect in four of these
experiments (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007, 2–4 & 6) did not emerge until later in the experiment. Calvo
and Nummenmaa (2007) hypothesized that the affective priming effect emerged only toward the end of
the experiment because repeated exposure to the primes was necessary. However, Calvo and colleagues
failed to find a lateralized affective priming effect in one experiment (Calvo et al., 2010, experiment 2).
In sum, the repeated exposure technique produced lateralized affective priming effects in four of five
experiments.
The second exposure technique important for obtaining a lateralized affective priming effect was
pre-exposure to the stimuli prior to the lateralized affective priming task. In three experiments a LVF
(RH) lateralized affective priming effect was found when pre-exposure was used. Specifically, the
lateralized affective priming effect occurred in three experiments with a preview phase that exposed all
of the participants to the experimental pictures (Calvo & Avero, 2008, experiments 2 & 3; Calvo &
Nummenmaa, 2007, experiment 1). Yet, an experiment that did not use a preview phase (Calvo &
Avero, 2008, experiment 1) failed to reveal a lateralized affective priming effect. Calvo and colleagues
concluded that repeated exposure of stimuli is necessary to achieve lateralized affective priming effects.
Thus, Calvo and colleagues’ research suggests that this repeated exposure can occur either via a preexposure to stimuli prior to the priming paradigm or via repeated exposure to stimuli in the priming
3

paradigm itself (i.e. the effect will only emerge later in the paradigm; see Table 1 for a summary). There
is evidence in keeping with Calvo and colleagues’ perspective specifying that affective information
cannot be processed without identification of the stimulus first (Lazarus, 1982; Storbeck, Robinson, &
McCourt, 2006; cf. Bargh, 1997; Zajonc, 1980). Given that evaluative processes vary in strength
(Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999), which in turn can
interact with the cerebral hemispheres (Heller, 1993), it follows that the evaluative strength of stimuli
may be linked to the lateralized affective priming effect.
An important question in the affective priming literature (see Fazio, 2001; Klauer & Musch,
2003; Wittenbrink, 2007) is whether the affective priming effect is modulated by prime strength3.
Interest on the topic was sparked by theory positing that evaluative information is stored in memory
varying in strength (see Fazio, 2007). Some studies, for instance, found prime strength moderates the
affective priming effect for strong primes when participants evaluate (e.g., “pleasant” vs. “unpleasant”)
targets (i.e., evaluative decision task; Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992, experiment 1; Fazio et
al., 1986, experiments 1 & 2; Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999, experiment 1; but cf. Bargh et al.,
1992, experiment 3; Klauer et al., 2009, experiment 5). However, some studies have failed to replicate
this effect (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Giner-Sorolla, et al., 1999, experiment 2; but
see also Glaser & Banaji, 1999). Despite mixed findings, prime strength as a moderator of the affective
priming paradigm appears strongest when there is an explicit goal to evaluate targets.
Examining the role of prime strength with regard to lateralized affective priming is relevant
because prime strength may contribute to Calvo and colleagues’ findings. Specifically, Calvo and
Avero (2008) manipulated affective pictures by valence to satisfy a manipulation check; this procedure
ensured that the normed ratings of their pleasant and unpleasant affective pictures were different from
one another. Interestingly, the arousal ratings of their stimuli also differed; the arousal ratings for the
unpleasant pictures were significantly greater than the arousal ratings for pleasant pictures. This is a
4

potential problem because some evidence suggests that prime strength moderates lateralized affective
priming. Specifically, Robinson and Compton (2006) presented participants with foveally presented
affective pictures as primes (manipulating prime strength by altering arousal) and then either one or two
dots to the parafovea. Participants were quicker to respond when primes high in strength (i.e., arousal)
were presented to the LVF (RH) than the RVF (LH), regardless of valence. This evidence in
conjunction with theory linking the right posterior hemisphere with arousal (see Heller, 1993) suggests
that prime strength may moderate the lateralized affective priming effect.

Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate and extend Calvo and colleagues’ (Calvo & Avero,
2008; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007) lateralized affective priming effect by specifically examining the
impact of prime strength. First, a preview phase exposed participants to the prime stimuli because all
experiments of Calvo and colleagues’ that used this technique found a LVF (RH) advantage. Next,
participants underwent an affective priming paradigm with unilateral prime stimulus presentations (2.5°
from fixation) making evaluative decisions on targets. In addition, the stimuli were repeated across a
number of blocks, which will allowed us to examine whether lateralized affective priming emerged only
later in the experiment.
Hypotheses
Consistent with past literature (e.g., Fazio, et al., 1986; Hermans, et al., 1994; Spruyt, De Houwer, et al.,
2007), (1) target responses should be quicker when preceded by affectively congruent than incongruent
primes, (2) the affective priming effect should be specific to strong primes (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender,
& Pratto, 1992; Fazio et al., 1986; Giner-Sorolla, García, & Bargh, 1999), and (3) the affective priming
effect should be present in the LVF (RH; Calvo & Avero, 2008; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007). Further,
if prime strength influences the lateralized affective priming effect similar to related priming paradigms
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(e.g., Robinson & Compton, 2006), (4) then the lateralized affective priming effect should occur for high
prime strength.

6

Chapter 2: Method
2.1

Participants
The final sample consisted of fifty-seven participants4 (47 females; ages 16–52; M = 21.65, SD =

6.30) who received course credit for the experiment. An additional five participants were run; however,
data from three were unusable due to computer problems and two participants’ accuracy rates were 2.5
SDs below the grand mean so their data were not used. All participants reported normal or corrected-tonormal vision (M = 20/22.17) and 50 participants were right-handed (Oldfield, 1971).
2.2

Stimuli
One hundred and ninety-two pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS;

Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) were used. These stimuli are based on normed ratings of valence and
arousal dimensions (1 = unpleasant/calm, 9 = pleasant/excited). These stimuli (760 X 600 pixels) were
diverse in semantic categories (i.e., people, animals, environmental scenes), presented in original color
against a dark background. These 192 pictures were divided into two stimulus sets of 96 pictures each,
and within each set stimuli were grouped by valence ratings (pleasant vs. unpleasant) and arousal ratings
(high vs. low). For each participant one set served as primes and the other served as targets
(counterbalanced across participants). The stimuli were carefully matched based on groupings of the
valence and arousal dimensions of the stimuli. Grouped by valence, half of the stimuli (48) in each set
(96) were pleasant and the other half were unpleasant, equated on arousal. Grouped by arousal, half of
the stimuli in each set were high whereas the other half were low in arousal, equated for valence. There
were no differences between the two sets in valence or arousal ratings based on either grouping variable.
Collapsing across both sets and grouping by valence, the valence dimension significantly differed, t
(171.63) = 46.18, p < .001, between pleasant (M = 7.23, SD = .55) and unpleasant (M = 2.80, SD = .77)
stimuli, but the valences were equated for arousal (M = 5.37, SD = 1.24 vs. M = 5.61, SD = .83,
respectively), t (165.91) = -1.56, p =.12. Finally, collapsing across both sets and grouping by arousal,
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the arousal dimension significantly differed, t (190) = 15.53, p < .001, between high (M = 6.28, SD =
.79) and low (M = 4.70, SD = .59) stimuli, but valence was equated (M = 4.86, SD = 2.27 vs. M = 5.16,
SD = 2.36, respectively), t (190) = .89, p =.37. All stimuli were presented with E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). See Table 2 for a complete summary of the stimuli.
2.3

Procedure
Upon arrival participants were provided informed consent and then filled out a brief

questionnaire regarding demographics, handedness, and vision. Next, participants’ visual acuity was
assessed. Participants were then seated in a chair in front of a 17” monitor (refresh rate 60 Hz) to begin
the preview phase (i.e., viewing all of the experimental primes foveally) of the experiment. After the
preview phase, participants were taken to an isolated room and seated in front of a 22” monitor (refresh
rate 60 Hz) for the experimental phase. The experimenter instructed participants to remain still while
seated upright, fixate on the center of the screen, and avoid eye movements from the fixation point.
Last, the experimenter instructed participants to ignore the first stimulus presented laterally (i.e., the
prime) and indicate whether the second picture (i.e., the target) presented centrally was pleasant or
unpleasant (i.e., evaluative decision task) as quickly and accurately as possible with both index fingers
(key assignment counterbalanced across participants). Once the experimenter left the room, the
participants could initiate the experiment. The experiment ran at the participants’ pace so breaks
between each experimental block were as long as participants needed. The preview phase until the end
of the experimental phase took on average 45 minutes.
Preview phase. During the preview phase participants were presented the primes one at a time
centrally. Because the target stimuli received additional foveal exposure by being presented centrally
throughout the study (compared to the prime stimuli that were always presented unilaterally), the targets
were not included in the preview phase. Participants’ task during the preview phase was to assess the
arousal of the prime stimuli with a 9-point likert scale using a keyboard with numeric keys
8

corresponding to the images on the monitor of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang,
1994). The timing of a single trial of the preview sequence was “+” (200 ms), inter-stimulus interval
(ISI; 100 ms), stimulus display (1,000 ms), ISI (100 ms), arousal assessment (until participant
responded), inter-trial interval (ITI; 100 ms). Each trial exposed a single prime stimulus that was not
repeated in the preview phase again; thus, the preview phase consisted of 96 trials. The preview phase
took on average 10 minutes to complete.
Experimental phase. For the experimental phase participants were seated 50 cm from the
monitor in a comfortable armchair in an isolated room. Each prime was presented briefly (150 ms) to
preclude eye movements (Banich, 1997; Bradshaw, 1991; Rayner, 1998) and unilaterally 2.5° (2.18 cm)
from the center of the screen to project to the parafovea. Each prime subtended a visual angle of 23.47°
(width: 21.45 cm) X 16.93° (height: 18.92 cm). The timing of each experimental trial (see Figure 1)
was similar to previous affective priming studies.
Each block consisted of 106 trials, 10 practice trials at the start of each block and 96 subsequent
experimental trials presented evenly (48 trials) to each visual field. Of the 48 experimental trials
presented to each visual field, four types of prime stimuli were paired with either a centrally presented
pleasant or unpleasant target: a high arousing pleasant (HP) prime, high arousing unpleasant (HU)
prime, low arousing pleasant (LP) prime, or low arousing unpleasant (LU) prime. Thus, eight different
prime-target combinations per visual field were possible. Each picture was presented only once per
block.
Altogether the experiment consisted of six blocks, resulting in 576 experimental trials. One
quarter of the experimental trials (144) were high arousing congruent (HU-unpleasant; HP-pleasant),
one quarter high arousing incongruent (HU-pleasant; HP-unpleasant), one quarter low arousing
congruent (LU-unpleasant; LP-pleasant), and one quarter low arousing incongruent (LU-pleasant; LPunpleasant). Irrespective of prime strength, half of the trials (288) were affectively congruent (e.g.,
9

pleasant-pleasant; unpleasant-unpleasant) and the other half were affectively incongruent (e.g., pleasantunpleasant; unpleasant-pleasant).
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Chapter 3: Results
3.1

Data Analytic Approach & Design
Prior to analysis, two participants’ data were removed because their accuracy rates were less than

2.5 SDs of the original group mean (adj. M = 88.01%, SD = 6.90%). Response latency data were then
filtered so responses prior to 300 ms were removed and responses 2.5 SDs above each participant’s
mean were replaced with the 2.5 SD value above each participant’s mean (see Wittenbrink, 2007). Last,
prior to analysis, response latency data were logarithmically transformed to correct positive skew (Fazio,
1990) and to remain consistent with the majority of affective priming paradigms’ analytic approach.
Transformed data were analyzed but Ms and SDs of the uncorrected data are reported to ease
interpretation. Response latency data were analyzed with a 2 (affective congruity: congruent vs.
incongruent) X 2 (prime strength: high vs. low) X 2 (visual field: left vs. right) Repeated Measures
ANOVA5. Response accuracy and preview phase data are supplemental (see Appendix A).
3.2

Response Latencies
Consistent with the first hypothesis, targets affectively congruent with primes (M = 714 ms, SD =

99 ms) were responded to quicker than targets incongruent with primes (M = 719 ms, SD = 99 ms), F (1,
56) = 7.28, p = .009, !p2 = .11. The second hypothesis was also supported, prime strength interacted
with affective congruity, F (1, 56) = 4.29, p = .043, !p2 = .07. Targets affectively congruent with high
arousing primes (M = 715 ms, SD = 100 ms) were responded to quicker than targets affectively
incongruent with high arousing primes (M = 723 ms, SD = 100 ms), F (1, 56) = 8.69, p = .005, !p2 = .07;
no affective congruity effect emerged with low arousing primes (F = .04).
In addition to the above hypothesized findings, there were a few other non-hypothesized effects
that reached statistical significance. There was a main effect of prime strength, F (1, 56) = 7.86, p =
.007, !p2 = .12, such that responses to targets were quicker when primes were low (M = 714 ms, SD = 99
11

ms) compared to high arousing (M = 719 ms, SD = 99 ms). This effect appears driven by high arousing
primes incongruent with targets that have very slow response latencies (see Figures 2 & 3, bottom
panels). An effect of visual field was also found, F (1, 56) = 14.30, p < .001, !p2 = .07, such that
responses to targets were quicker when preceded by a prime in the RVF (LH; M = 715 ms, SD = 99 ms)
relative to the LVF (RH; M = 719 ms, SD = 99 ms). Finally, prime strength and visual field interacted
such that responses to targets were quicker when high arousing primes were presented to the RVF (LH)
relative to the LVF (RH), F (1, 56) = 17.15, p < .001, !p2 = .07; however, this trend was not significant
for targets preceded by low arousing primes (F = .04).
Although the affective congruity by visual field as well as the prime strength by affective
congruity by visual field interactions were non-significant (Fs = .29 and .80, respectively), planned
comparisons were conducted to examine hypotheses three and four. Inconsistent with the third
hypothesis, there was no affective congruity effect in the LVF (RH), F (1, 56) = 1.19, p = .28, !p2 = .02.
Unexpectedly, targets affectively congruent with primes (M = 712 ms, SD = 98 ms) presented to the
RVF (LH) were responded to more quickly than targets affectively incongruent with primes presented to
the RVF (LH; M = 718 ms, SD = 100 ms), F (1, 56) = 8.70, p = .005, !p2 = .13 (see Figure 2, top panel).
Inconsistent with the hypothesis four, there was no affective congruity effect when high arousing primes
were presented to the LVF (RH), F (1, 56) = 1.75, p = .19, !p2 = .03. However, targets affectively
congruent with high arousing primes (M = 708 ms, SD = 98 ms) in the RVF (LH) were responded to
quicker compared to targets affectively incongruent with high arousing primes in the RVF (LH; M = 720
ms, SD = 104 ms), F (1, 56) = 8.69, p = .005, !p2 = .13 (see Figure 2, bottom panel). Affective
congruity effects for low arousing primes were absent for both left and right visual fields (Fs = .04 and
.02, respectively).
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Experiment 2 Introduction
Consistent with the first hypothesis, responses were faster to targets affectively congruent with
primes than affectively incongruent with primes.

This finding replicates recent work from our

laboratory (Herring et al., 2011) as well as numerous other affective priming experiments (see Klauer &
Musch, 2003). Also, consistent with hypothesis two and studies using an evaluative decision task
(Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999) we found that targets affectively
congruent with high arousing primes were responded to quicker than targets affectively incongruent
with high arousing primes, but the affective congruity effect did not occur for low arousing primes.
The third hypothesis that the affective congruity effect would occur in the LVF (RH) was not
supported, contradicting the majority of Calvo and colleagues’ studies (Calvo & Avero, 2008; Calvo &
Nummenmaa, 2007). Unexpectedly, the affective congruity effect was present in the RVF (LH). That
is, participants responded more quickly to targets affectively congruent with primes presented in the
RVF (LH) than targets affectively incongruent with primes presented in the RVF (LH). Hypothesis
four, that participants would respond faster to targets affectively congruent with high arousing primes in
the LVF (RH) than targets affectively incongruent with high arousing primes in the LVF (RH), also
failed to gain support. Instead, targets were quicker to high arousing primes affectively congruent in the
RVF (LH) versus targets affectively incongruent with high arousing primes in the RVF (LH). These
findings contradict theory positing that the right hemisphere is specialized for affective processing
(Borod et al., 2001; Demaree, Everhart, Youngstrom, & Harrison, 2005), in addition to theory
maintaining that the right hemisphere is sensitive to arousal (Heller, 1993; Heller, Nitschke, & Miller,
1998).
In one of Calvo and colleagues’ studies, in addition to obtaining a LVF (RH) affective congruity
effect, an affective congruity effect for the RVF (LH) was also uncovered (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007,
experiment 6).

A major similarity between Experiment 1 and Calvo and Nummenmaa’s (2007)
13

Experiment 6 is how primes were repeatedly exposed. In both the current experiment as well as Calvo
and Nummenmaa (2007) half the stimuli were always primes and half the stimuli were always targets.
Thus, only repeated parafoveal exposure of primes was received. Another one of Calvo and colleagues’
experiments (Calvo, Nummenmaa, & Avero, 2010) that failed to replicate the lateralized affective
priming effect also used repeated parafoveal exposure of primes. In contrast, Calvo and colleagues’
experiments (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007, experiments 2 & 3) that intermixed stimuli so each stimulus
could serve as both primes and targets (i.e., parafoveal and foveal exposure of primes), found consistent
evidence of the affective congruity effect in the LVF (RH; see Table 3). In neither of these experiments
was a pre-exposure phase used; hence we used a pre-exposure phase in Experiment 1 to provide
repeated foveal exposure.
Experiment 2
The objective of Experiment 2 was to determine whether mode of repeated exposure of the prime
stimuli matters. Rather than presenting half the stimuli as just primes and the other half as just targets as
in Experiment 1 (i.e., parafoveal repeated exposure), participants now viewed each picture in half the
blocks as primes and the other half of blocks as targets. In this way, prime stimuli receive additional
exposure both parafoveally and foveally. As in Experiment 1, (1) target responses should be quicker
when preceded by affectively congruent than incongruent primes (e.g., Fazio, et al., 1986; Hermans, et
al., 1994; Spruyt, De Houwer, et al., 2007), (2) the affective priming effect should be specific to strong
primes (Bargh et al., 1992; Fazio et al., 1986; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999), and (3) the affective priming
effect should occur in the LVF (RH; Calvo & Avero, 2008; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007). Further, if
prime strength influences the lateralized affective priming effect similar to related priming paradigms
(e.g., Robinson & Compton, 2006), (4) then the lateralized affective priming effect should occur for high
prime strength.
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Chapter 5: Method & Results
5.1

Participants
The final sample consisted of thirty-six participants (27 female; ages 18–32; M = 20, SD = 2.82)

who received course credit for the experiment. An additional participant was run; however, data from
this participant were unusable due to an accuracy rate 2.5 SDs below the original grand mean (adj. M =
84.86%, SD = 11.89%). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision (M = 20/22.15)
and 33 participants were right-handed (Oldfield, 1971).

5.2

Stimuli and Procedure
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1. The only changes to the procedure

were that (1) all of the stimuli were presented during the preview phase and (2) stimuli were primes in
half of the blocks and targets the other half of blocks.

5.3

Response Latencies
The response latency data were analyzed the same as in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1,

response accuracy and preview phase data are supplemental (see Appendix B). The overall analysis
revealed no significant findings from the omnibus F-tests. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, there was no
affective congruity effect, F (1, 35) = 1.38, p = .25, !p2 = .04, though the trend for participants to
respond faster to targets affectively congruent with primes (M = 742 ms, SD = 86 ms) than targets
affectively incongruent with primes (M = 746 ms, SD = 79 ms) was present. The interaction between
prime strength and affective congruity approached significance, F (1, 35) = 2.65, p = .11, !p2 = .07.
Simple effect tests revealed that participants responded more quickly to targets affectively congruent
with high arousing primes (M = 742 ms, SD = 85 ms) than affectively incongruent with high arousing
primes (M = 750 ms, SD = 82 ms), F (1, 35) = 4.56, p = .04, !p2 = .12. No affective congruity effect
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emerged with low arousing primes (F = .04). This finding supports hypothesis two and replicates
Experiment 1.
Although the affective congruity by visual field as well as the prime strength by affective
congruity by visual field interactions were non-significant (Fs = .15 and .002, respectively) as in
Experiment 1, planned comparisons were conducted. Inconsistent with the third hypothesis, there was
no affective congruity effect in the LVF (RH), F (1, 35) = 1.18, p = .28, !p2 = .03, nor was there an
affective congruity effect in the RVF (LH) as in Experiment 1, F (1, 35) = 1.58, p = .22, !p2 = .04 (see
Figure 3, top panel). Consistent with the fourth hypothesis, there was a strong trend for participants to
respond quicker to targets affectively congruent with high arousing primes presented in the LVF (RH; M
= 741 ms, SD = 81 ms) than targets affectively incongruent with high arousing primes presented in the
LVF (RH; M = 751 ms, SD = 85 ms), F (1, 35) = 3.84, p = .058, !p2 = .10. This effect was not present
in the RVF (LH), F (1, 35) = 1.60, p = .21, !p2 = .04 (see Figure 3, bottom panel). Affective congruity
effects for low arousing primes were absent for both left and right visual fields (Fs = .001 and .097,
respectively).
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
The present experiments have implications for how task structure influences the lateralized
affective priming paradigm. For example, two variables that have received attention with respect to task
structure are prime strength and type of task the participants use when responding to target stimuli (e.g.,
Klauer & Musch, 2003; Wittenbrink, 2007). A major advancement of the present study was the
examination of mode of repeated exposure. Understanding how task structure influences the affective
priming effect is significant because it can help understand how evaluations are structured in memory
(e.g., Fazio, 2007) and provide clues for processing mechanisms of the affective priming effect
(Wittenbrink, 2007).
Simple effects analysis in both experiments revealed that target responses were quicker to high
arousing affectively congruent primes relative to high arousing affectively incongruent primes. An
affective congruity effect was not found, however, for low arousing primes. These findings are
consistent with the notion that evaluations vary in strength (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Feldman Barrett &
Russell, 1999; Norris et al., 2010) and with several studies that found an affective congruity effect for
only high arousing primes using an evaluative decision task (see Bargh, Chaiken, et al., 1992; Fazio,
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, et al., 1986; Giner-Sorolla, García, et al., 1999). The present study extends
previous research on attitude prime strength by demonstrating that this effect is also obtained by
manipulating prime arousal. Thus, the finding that affective congruity occurs for strong primes seems
less of a specific evaluative process (i.e., just due to attitude strength), but more of a global evaluative
process (occurs for attitude strength and affective arousal).
Experiments 1 and 2 were nearly identical, but the main difference was the task structure. In
Experiment 1, the stimuli were divided such that half were presented only as primes and the other half
were presented only as targets. In this way, prime stimuli only received repeated parafoveal exposure.
However, in Experiment 2, the stimuli were intermixed so the stimuli received additional foveal
17

exposure. The primary hypothesis, that the lateralized affective priming effect would occur for high
arousing primes, received partial support through simple effects analysis. In Experiment 1, target
responses were quicker to affectively congruent than incongruent high arousing primes presented in the
RVF (LH; as opposed to the LVF [RH] as predicted). Interestingly, in Experiment 2 when repeated
foveal and parafoveal exposure of primes was used, the lateralized affective priming effect no longer
occurred for high arousing primes in the RVF (LH). Instead, there was a strong trend of the lateralized
affective priming effect as expected: affectively congruent targets were responded to faster compared to
affectively incongruent targets preceded by high arousing primes in the LVF (RH). This finding
supports the views that the right hemisphere is generally involved in affective perception (Borod et al.,
2001; Demaree et al., 2005) and is sensitive to arousal (Heller, 1993; Heller et al., 1998). This finding
also advances prior lateralized affective priming studies, which did not control arousal, by showing that
arousal level contributes to the lateralized affective priming effect.
The finding that the RVF (LH) was sensitive to affective congruity, particularly for high
arousing primes, is paradoxical. One possibility is that semantic and not affective priming occurred in
Experiment 1, as the present stimuli were not systemically controlled for semantics. It may be that
semantic pre-processing can occur (see Fuentes, Carmona, Agis, & Catena, 1994; Van den Bussche,
Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009) via repeated parafoveal exposure of primes. In addition to
semantics potentially driving the RVF (LH) effect found in Experiment 1, the moderation of high
arousing primes could have resulted from strongly associated stimuli instead of arousal, per se. Recent
evidence supports the position that the left hemisphere is sensitive to semantic processing of high
associative strength (e.g., Lovseth & Atchley, 2010).
The above findings underscore two important points regarding lateralized affective priming.
First, the finding that mode of repeated exposure influences affective priming provides additional
support for the notion that affective priming effects are susceptible to task structure. Second, these
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findings have important theoretical implications considering the longstanding debate of whether
affective information is processed prior to identification (Bargh, 1997; Robinson, 1998; Zajonc, 1980),
or vice versa (Cave & Batty, 2006; Lazarus, 1984; Storbeck & Clore, 2007; Storbeck, Robinson, &
McCourt, 2006). These findings are notable given continued debate over whether affective processing
bypasses normal cortical processing via a “low route” (LeDoux, 1996; but cf. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).
The present finding that additional foveal exposure of primes is needed to obtain a lateralized affective
priming effect is in keeping with Cave and Batty’s (2006) position that practice (or repetition in this
case) improves performance by connecting simple features of stimuli that are presented peripherally
with high-level processing mechanisms of affect. Presumably this process occurs because a bottom-up
system finds specific affective features that stand out (e.g., shapes associated with certain affective
displays) and works through attentional gates reaching the high-level semantic representation of affect
that then engages a top-down system to enhance performance for affective information (see Cave, 1999;
but see also Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994).
One curious finding is the failure to find an overall affective congruity effect, though affective
congruity did emerge in both experiments for high arousing primes. A large number of studies show
that the affective priming effect is robust, particularly when an evaluative decision task is carried out
(see Klauer & Musch, 2003). Experiment 1 was consistent with this large affective priming literature as
well as previous studies using pictures (e.g., Avero & M. Calvo, 2006; Hermans, De Houwer, et al.,
1994; Herring et al., in press; Spruyt, Hermans, Houwer, & Eelen, 2002), as responses were quicker to
targets affectively congruent than incongruent with primes. However, Experiment 2 failed to replicate
this effect. One explanation is that the second experiment was underpowered by having fewer
participants than the first experiment.
Future investigations of lateralized affective priming could profit from a couple of extensions.
First, just testing the right hemisphere hypothesis of affective processing, which does not lend itself well
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to explaining left hemispheric contributions, was perhaps a narrow focus of the present study. For
instance, the approach-withdrawal model (see Demaree et al., 2005; Harmon-Jones, 2003 for reviews)
posits that the left and right hemispheres are associated with approach and avoidance tendencies,
respectively. Future studies that adopt a motivational direction perspective (i.e., approach-withdrawal)
may account better for the lateralized affective priming data. Second, the present findings examined
only the effect of affective hemispheric asymmetry on behavior (i.e., response latencies). Future studies
could augment behavioral data by providing additional electrophysiological data. A component elicited
in prior affective priming studies (Herring et al., 2011; Hinojosa, Carretié, Méndez-Bértolo, Míguez, &
Pozo, 2009; Kissler, Herbert, Winkler, & Junghofer, 2009; Taylor, 2010; Werheid, Alpay, Jentzsch, &
Sommer, 2005; Zhang, Li, Gold, & Jiang, 2010), the late positive potential (LPP), may be used in
conjunction with behavioral measures to examine mode of repeated exposure. For example, the current
position that repeated foveal exposure is needed for a lateralized affective priming effect would receive
stronger support if the LPP was elicited with repeated foveal exposure but was not elicited with
parafoveal repeated exposure.

Conclusion
The present experiments extend previous literature in two important ways. First, the present
experiments showed that the lateralized affective priming effect is sensitive to prime strength, whereas
previous studies (Calvo & Avero, 2008; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007; Calvo et al., 2010) did not
systematically control prime strength possibly masking contributions of this variable. Assessing prime
strength via arousal also allows for a more complete understanding of affective processing given the
view that arousal and valence contribute to the structure of affect (e.g., Feldman Barrett & Russell,
1998, 1999; Russell, 1980; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). The most important extension of the
present experiments was the finding that mode of repeated exposure of stimuli influences the lateralized
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affective priming effect. This finding adds to a growing body of affective priming literature suggesting
that the affective priming effect is sensitive to task structure. When stimuli receive both parafoveal and
foveal exposure the affective priming effect occurs in the LVF (RH). These findings suggest that the
lateralized affective priming effect emerges when repeated foveal exposures of stimuli activate highlevel mechanisms of affect that then engage a top-down system that actively seeks affective information.
Thus, lateralized affective priming is contingent on identification first.
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Footnotes
1

Previously we have referred to this paradigm as “evaluative” priming. The change to “affect” is

intentional to be more specific to the present experiments.
2

These three studies had a total of 12 experiments. Three of the experiments are not being

discussed because two (Calvo & Avero, 2008, experiment 4; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007, experiment
5) did not use probe stimuli, while the third (Calvo, Nummenmaa, & Avero, 2010, experiment 1) did not
report affective congruity analyses.
3

The distinction between accessibility and extremity is not made because the two constructs tend

to be correlated (Bargh et al., 1992b; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993). The term
“prime strength” is used instead more generally, which also encompasses prime arousal.
4

An original power analysis suggested that 34 participants were needed, however, additional

participants were run because the desired lateralized affective priming effect was thought to be
underpowered. The sample collected in Experiment 2 was based on the original power analysis.
5

When prime valence was entered into the design this variable only interacted with prime

strength such that response times were quicker to targets when preceded with a pleasant prime low in
arousal compared to an unpleasant prime low in arousal. Target arousal was not examined because this
variable was beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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Table 1
Summary of Relevant Experiments on the Lateralized Affective Priming Effect by Preview Phase,
Repeated Exposure, and Findings
Study

Experiment

Preview Phase

Repeated Exposure

LVF (RH)
Advantage

Calvo & Nummenmaa

1

Y

N

Y

2

N

Y

Y

3

N

Y

Y

4

N

Y

Y

6

N

Y

Y

1

N

N

N

2

Y

N

Y

3

Y

N

Y

2

N

Y

N

(2007)

Calvo & Avero (2008)

Calvo, Nummenmaa, &
Avero (2010)

Note. Y = yes; N = no; LVF (RH) = left visual field (right hemisphere).
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Table 2
Means (SDs) of valence and arousal ratings as a function of grouping variables and stimulus set
Valence ratings
Grouping variables

Set 1 (n = 96)

Set 2 (n = 96)

t (df)

p

Pleasant

7.22 (.55)a

7.23 (.54)a

-.11 (94)

.91

Unpleasant

2.81 (.79)b

2.78 (.75)b

.16 (94)

.87

High

4.83 (2.17)a

4.90 (2.38)a

-.15 (94)

.88

Low

5.20 (2.46)a

5.12 (2.29)a

.17 (94)

.86

5.01 (2.31)

5.01 (2.33)

.02 (190)

.99

Valence type

Arousal type

Total

Arousal ratings
Grouping variables

Set 1 (n = 96)

Set 2 (n = 96)

t (df)

p

Pleasant

5.29 (1.30)a

5.45 (1.18)a

-.66 (93.10)

.51

Unpleasant

5.59 (.94)a

5.63 (.71)a

-.23 (88.11)

.82

High

6.28 (.95)a

6.28 (.62)a

-.03 (94)

.98

Low

4.60 (.52)b

4.80 (.65)b

-1.86 (94)

.09

5.44 (1.13)

5.54 (.97)

-.68 (185.68) .50

Valence type

Arousal type

Total

Note. Identical superscripts going down between pairs (e.g., high vs. low for by arousal type for valence
ratings) indicate no significant difference (p > .05).
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Table 3
Updated Summary of Relevant Experiments on the Lateralized Affective Priming Effect Including Type of Repeated Exposure
Study

Experiment

Preview Phase

Repeated Exposure

Type of Repeated Exposure

LVF (RH)
Advantage

Calvo & Nummenmaa

1

Y

N

Y

2

N

Y

Parafoveal + foveal

Y

3

N

Y

Parafoveal + foveal

Y

4

N

Y

Parafoveal

Y

6

N

Y

Parafoveal

Y (RVF)

1

N

N

N

2

Y

N

Y

3

Y

N

Y

2

N

Y

Parafoveal

N

1

Y

Y

Parafoveal

N (RVF)

(2007)

Calvo & Avero (2008)

Calvo, Nummenmaa, &
Avero (2010)
Herring (2011)

Note. Y = yes; N = no; (RVF) = right visual field effect also present; LVF (RH) = left visual field (right hemisphere).
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OR

+

LVF

RVF

Fixation (200)

ISI (100)

Prime (150)

Time

ISI (150); SOA (300)

Target (up to 1500)
“pleasant” or “unpleasant”
ITI (1000)

Figure 1. Timing (ms) of the priming sequence. ISI = inter-stimulus interval; SOA = Stimulusonset asynchrony, and ITI = inter-trial interval; LVF = left visual field; RVF = right visual field.
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Figure 2. Affective congruity X visual field effect (top panel) and Affective congruity X VF X Prime
Strength effect (bottom panel) for Experiment 1. Stars indicate significance (p = .005).

35

Figure 3. Affective congruity X visual field effect (top panel) and Affective congruity X VF X Prime
Strength effect, F (1, 35) = 3.84, p = .058, !p2 = .10, (bottom panel) for Experiment 2.
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Appendix A
Supplemental Analyses of Experiment 1
Response Accuracy
Response accuracy data were arcsine transformed to normalize the distribution (Howell, 2002)
and then analyzed but percentages are reported to ease interpretation. A 2 (affective congruity) X 2
(prime valence) X 2 (prime arousal) X 2 (visual field) Repeated Measures ANOVA revealed a prime
valence X congruity interaction, F (1, 56) = 4.16, p = .046, !p2 = .07. Simple effects revealed a trend for
more accurate responses to targets incongruent with pleasant primes (M = 89.70%, SD = 8.25%) than
targets congruent with pleasant primes (M = 86.10%, SD = 11.56%), F (1, 56) = 3.22, p = .078, !p2 =
.05. However, targets congruent with unpleasant primes were responded to more accurately (M =
90.40%, SD = 8.57%) than targets incongruent with unpleasant primes (M = 85.80%, SD = 11.80%), F
(1, 56) = 5.63, p = .021, !p2 = .11. A prime valence X affective congruity X visual field interaction was
also uncovered, F (1, 56) = 7.43, p = .009, !p2 = .11. Simple effects revealed that targets affectively
congruent with unpleasant primes presented in the LVF (RH) were responded to more accurately (M =
90.60%, SD = 8.78%) than targets affectively incongruent with unpleasant primes (M = 85.20%, SD =
11.77%) presented in the LVF (RH), F (1, 56) = 8.08, p = .006, !p2 = .13. Further, targets affectively
incongruent with pleasant primes presented in the LVF (RH) were responded to more accurately (M =
90.30%, SD = 8.69%) than targets affectively congruent with unpleasant primes (M = 85.80%, SD =
11.37%) presented in the LVF (RH), F (1, 56) = 5.12, p = .028, !p2 = .08. The affective congruity
effects for unpleasant and pleasant primes presented in the right visual filed were not significant, Fs =
2.75 and 1.21, respectively. Finally, a prime arousal X prime valence X visual field interaction was
uncovered, F (1, 56) = 5.98, p = .018, !p2 = .09, but is not discussed further as it is theoretically
irrelevant.
Preview Phase Ratings
Though no hypotheses were generated regarding the preview phase arousal ratings, analyses
were conducted as a manipulation check. First, an average rating of the 96 prime pictures was computed
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for each participant and all participants were found to be within 2.5 SDs of the grand mean (M = 4.39).
Second, the two stimulus sets were combined as no differences were found between the four prime
conditions between sets (ps > .05). Next, a Repeated Measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
prime type, F (3, 59) = 38.61, p < .001, !p2 = .66. All prime types were significantly different from one
another (ps < .001) with HU primes rated the most arousing followed by LU primes, HP primes, and LP
primes. Finally, one-sample t-tests were conducted comparing each prime condition to the IAPS ratings.
For all but the LU prime condition, prime arousal ratings were significantly lower compared to the IAPS
ratings (ps < .001). In general, the present sample underrated prime arousal by a little more than one
ratings compared to the IAPS (see Table A1).
Table A1
Mean Arousal Ratings During the Preview Phase in Experiment 1
Prime Strength

Experiment 1

IAPS

Mean difference

HU

5.74a

6.29

-.55*

LU

4.92b

4.93

-.008

HP

4.02c

6.27

-2.26**

LP

2.92d

4.47

-1.55**

Average
4.39
5.49
-1.09**
Note. HU = high unpleasant; LU = low unpleasant; HP = high pleasant; LP = low pleasant; IAPS =
International Affective Picture System ratings. Different superscripts going down indicate significant
differences (ps < .001).
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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Appendix B
Supplemental Analyses of Experiment 2
Response Accuracy
Response accuracy data were analyzed the same as in Experiment 1 revealing only a prime
valence X affective congruity interaction, F (1, 35) = 5.96, p = .02, !p2 = .15. As in Experiment 1,
responses were more accurate to targets affectively congruent with unpleasant primes (M = 89.60%, SD
= 6.83%) than incongruent with unpleasant primes (M = 82.83%, SD = 12.64%), F (1, 35) = 9.63, p =
.004, !p2 = .21.

The simple contrast for affective congruity involving pleasant primes was not

significant (F = 2.35).
Preview Phase Ratings
The average of all the stimuli for participants were found to be within 2.5 SDs of the grand mean
(M = 4.80). Next, the two stimulus sets were compared and differences were found for the HU and HP
prime conditions (ps < .05). As such, these prime conditions were treated separately while the low
arousal conditions were averaged. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect of prime
type, F (5, 32) = 24.68, p < .001, !p2 = .79. All prime types were significantly different from one
another (ps < .001) with HU2 primes rated the highest followed by HU1 primes, LU primes, HP1
primes, HP2 primes, and LP primes. Finally, one-sample t-tests were conducted comparing each prime
condition to the IAPS ratings. All positive prime conditions were significantly lower compared to IAPS
(ps < .001), whereas the negative prime conditions were not (ps > .05). In general, the present sample
underrated prime arousal by a little more than half a ratings compared to the IAPS (see Table B1).
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Table B1
Mean Arousal Ratings During the Preview Phase in Experiment 2
Prime Strength

Experiment 2

IAPS

Mean difference

HU1

5.77a

6.39

-.61

HU2

5.95b

6.18

-.22

LU

5.15c

4.93

.22

HP1

3.98d

6.16

-2.17**

HP2

3.61e

6.38

-2.76**

LP

2.80f

4.47

-1.66**

Average

4.80

5.49

-.68*

Note. Different superscripts going down indicate significant differences (ps < .001).
*p = .01. **p < .001.
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